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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper evaluates the welfare gain from permanently reducing inflation from two percent to 
price stability and compares it the output cost associated with this transition. The paper 
emphasizes the distortions caused by the interaction of inflation and capital income taxation in 
calculating the gain from moving to a zero rate of inflation. Though the annual deadweight loss of 
a two percent inflation rate is 0.225 percent of GDP - a relatively small number when compared 
to the literature, since the real gain from shifting to price stability grows in perpetuity at the rate 
of growth of GDP, the present value is a substantial multiple of the annual welfare gain. 
Calculations reveal a present value gain of 15 percent of GDP. Since the corresponding one-off 
output cost of moving from two percent inflation to price stability is 0.034 percent of GDP, the 
gain outweighs the cost by an overwhelming margin.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
outh Africa moved to an inflation targeting framework in February of 2000. Ever since, the sole objective of 
the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) has been to ensure that inflation lies within the target band of 3-6 
percent. In this regard, the measurement of costs and benefits of inflation is of paramount importance in 
determining the legitimacy of the current target band and if there is a need to rethink the band in terms of the welfare 
cost of inflation at least. Among the costs, those that are caused by the interaction of inflation with tax rules need to 
be emphasized. Due to the non-indexation of the South African tax system, inflation exacerbates the inefficiencies 
generated by taxation. The quantitative significance of these efficiencies is likely to be particularly strong in case of 
taxation of capital – a mobile factor of production. Building on the methodological foundation of Feldstein‟s (1997, 
1999) approaches, this paper examines the welfare implications of the interaction between capital income taxation 
and inflation. We consider the per-year welfare effects of going from 2 percent
1
 inflation to price stability and 
compare them with the output costs of disinflation. 
 
 Based on the recent estimate of interest elasticity of money for South Africa, obtained by Gupta and 
Uwilingiye (2009b), a two percent inflation rate would translate into a welfare loss of 0.098 percent of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) using Bailey‟s (1956) consumer surplus approach.2 However, it must be realized that 
welfare cost calculations obtained by integrating under the money demand curve as the interest rate rises from zero 
to a positive value to obtain the lost consumer surplus and then deducting the associated seigniorage revenue to 
deduce the deadweight loss, is merely one-dimensional. This is because the consumer surplus approach fails to 
account for the fact that inflation, operating in conjunction with the tax system, has further distortionary effects on 
the intertemporal consumption choice (i.e., saving for old age), housing and the real cost of servicing government 
debt. Thus, the welfare costs obtained using the money demand approach is likely to provide the lower limit of such 
estimates, and hence, a more general approach, like the one adopted here, is desired to obtain the “true” size of the 
                                                 
1 Note the calculations are symmetric and, approximately, linear. Therefore, it is not difficult to translate the estimates, obtained 
under an inflation rate of 2 percent, for the width of the target band. The decision to use a 2 percent rate of inflation is dictated by 
the approach in the original contributions of Feldstein (1997, 1999), and the literature that followed thereof.  
2 See Gupta and Uwilingiye (2008, 2009a) for further details. 
S 
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welfare loss caused by inflation. It must, however, be stressed that recent evidence
3
 on the sacrifice ratio of South 
Africa tends to suggest that disinflation can be achieved at virtually no loss to employment and output. Given this 
and Feldstein‟s (1997, 1999) arguments that costs of disinflation are temporary while the benefits are permanent; 
i.e., one needs to compare the discounted stream of benefits with one-off output costs, even a small-sized estimated 
benefit could imply relatively large overall gain from a permanent disinflation of two percent.To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first attempt to measure the welfare cost of inflation for the South African economy using 
Feldstein‟s (1997, 1999) approaches that account for interactions between the tax system and inflation.4 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
 At the moment, most tax systems around the world are not completely indexed to ensure that the price-level 
changes leave real tax rates and real tax revenue unchanged. Inflation-induced distortions generated by the 
interaction of inflation and the non-indexed tax system have the potential to be much larger than the revenue-related 
effects on which most of the seigniorage and optimal inflation literature has focused (Walsh, 2003). 
 
 One important distortion arises when nominal income, and not real interest income, is taxed. It must be 
realized that it is after tax real rates of return that is relevant for individual agents in making saving and portfolio 
decisions, and if nominal income is subject to a tax rate of , the real after –tax return will be  
 
(1 )ar i     
 
 (1 )r   , (1) 
 
where i r   is the nominal return and r is the before-tax real return. Thus, for a given pre-tax real return r , the 
after-tax real return is decreasing in the rate of inflation. Practically speaking, let us consider a two–period 
overlapping generations model where an individual works and earns an income when young and also decides on 
how much to consume now and save for their old age. Suppose that savings are invested at the rate of r . Therefore, 
consumption in old age is related to savings by the following equation: 
 
(1 )Tc s r    (2) 
 
where T  is the length of the period between saving while young and dissaving in the old age. Then price of 
retirement consumption can be defined as  
 
 
1
1
T
p
r


.     (3) 
 
 Clearly, the relative price of old-age consumption P is affected by both tax system and inflation, since they 
distort the choice between current consumption and future consumption. Graphically, the scenario is depicted in 
Figure 1. 
 
 Figure 1 depicts the individual‟s compensated demand for retirement consumption, labeled as Quantity, as 
a function of the price of retirement consumption p , denoted as Price, at the time of the decision to save. The 
different points on the graph represent different scenarios. With combination 
0 0,c p  representing consumption 
decision without tax and inflation, the consumer surplus is A+B+C….+F. Introducing income taxes in an 
environment of price stability (no inflation) moves the equilibrium point from 0 0,c p to 1 1,c p which leads to  a lesser 
                                                 
3 See for example Akinboade et al. (2004), Woglom (2005), Gonçalves and Carvalho (2008), and Tunali (2008). 
4 For applications of Feldstein‟s (1997, 1999) approaches on other countries, refer to Bonato (1998) for New Zealand, Bakhshi et 
al., (1999) for the United Kingdom, Dolado et al., (1999) for Spain, Tödter and Ziebarth (1999) for Germany, O‟Reilly and Levac 
(2000) for Canada and Blaszkiewicz et al., (2003) for Poland and Ukraine. 
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retirement consumption at a higher price. Consumer surplus is now reduced to the area C+E+F and the tax revenue 
corresponding to that area is B+D. Triangle A, thus, represents the deadweight loss, which, in turn, is the reduction 
of consumer surplus not compensated by higher tax revenues. When we introduce both taxes and inflation at the 
equilibrium point from 
1 1,c p to 2 2,c p , again there is a reduction in consumption at a high price. The consumer 
surplus remaining is F and tax revenue is the rectangle D+E. The deadweight loss increases from triangle A to 
triangle A+B+C. 
 
 
Figure 1:  Demand for Retirement Consumption 
 
 
 Thus, moving from equilibrium inflation to price stability increases consumer surplus by the area C+E, the 
tax revenues change to area B-E (which can be negative or positive), and the welfare gain is B+C, which is a 
trapezoid as shown above. Unlike the traditional welfare analysis where welfare changes were obtained using 
“Haberger triangles” and therefore were of the second order; i.e., small in the presence of distortionary taxes, the 
initial situation is not optimal and welfare changes are of the first order, as indicated by a trapezoid rather than the 
triangle. 
 
Inflation and the Inter-Temporal Allocation of Consumption 
 
Distortions to Saving Behavior 
 
 The household has two main decisions to be make on their expenditure; namely, how much to consume and 
how much to invest in each period. Feldstein (1997) derives the welfare gain from reducing inflation in a two period 
consumption model. Individuals are given an initial endowment and then they decide on the portions of their income 
to consume and save in the first period in order to consume when they are retired in the second period.  The agent‟s 
first period savings earns a real rate of return, and in period one, the price of retirement consumption ( p ) is thought 
to be inversely related to this rate of return; i.e., the higher the rate on saving, the cheaper the effective price of 
retirement consumption. The rate of return on saving depends on both inflation and the tax system. According to 
Feldstein et al. (1978), inflation is a source of irregular change on the effective tax rate of capital income, which 
leads to changes in real net of post-tax return. Taxes drive a wedge between the pre-tax rate of return, which is 
assumed to be invariant to inflation, and the post tax return that households earn. Higher inflation raises the tax 
wedge and reduces the effective real post-tax return to saving and increases the price of retirement consumption. 
Given this, the welfare gains associated with reduction in inflation with the current tax system can be obtained from 
the following expression: 
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where 0p is the price of retirement consumption at zero inflation with no distortionary taxes, 1p is the retirement 
price evaluated under the current tax regime with price stability (zero inflation), and 2p is the price evaluated under 
the current tax regime with 2 percent inflation
5
.  2s  represents the initial gross saving of individual when young; 
ps
 is the uncompensated elasticity of saving with respect to the price of retirement consumption, and  is the 
propensity to save out of exogenous income. 
 
Note that to calculate
0p , we need the pre-tax real rate of return on savings. For this purpose, we use the 
rate of return on equity which on average was equal to 7.06 percent
6
 for the period 1990-2007. Assuming that at this 
rate of return, both inflation and taxes are non-existent and the time interval between saving and consumption is 30 
years, 
0p = (1+0.0706)
(-30)
=0.1292. In order to calculate the real return to savings in a world of taxes and inflation, 
we need to adjust the above real rate of return on savings for both corporate and personal sector taxes. The average 
rate of corporate income tax between 1990 and 2007 was 25.68 percent
7
 which, in turn, leaves a net real return r  to 
5.25 percent before personal tax deductions. The net of tax rate of return depends not only on the tax at the corporate 
level, but also on the taxes that individuals pay on interest income, dividends and capital gains. The effective 
marginal tax rate depends on the form of income and on the tax status of the individual. Feldstein (1997) 
summarizes these effects by assuming a uniform individual marginal tax rate across all sources of income. Given 
this, the individual marginal tax rate in South Africa, across all sources of income, averaged 25 percent
8
 over the 
period 1990-2007. This reduces the net return further, to 3.94 percent. The price of retirement consumption that 
corresponds to this net return of 3.94 percent is therefore 
2p = (1.0394)
 (-30) 
= 0.3137 where the subscript 2 on the 
price indicates the price of retirement at an inflation rate of 2 percent. 
 
 Reducing the equilibrium inflation rate from two percent to zero lowers the effective tax rate at both 
corporate and individual levels. At the corporate level, this has two opposing effects: 1) the changes in the 
equilibrium inflation rate alter the effective tax rate by changing the value of depreciation allowances and 2) it 
changes the value of the deduction of interest payments. Because the depreciation schedule that is allowed for 
calculating taxable profits is defined on the basis of historical nominal terms, a higher rate of inflation reduces the 
present value of depreciation and thereby increases the effective tax rate. This relation was approximated by 
Feldstein (1997) using a rule of thumb of 0.57 percent increase in taxable profit for each percentage point of 
inflation. Due to lack of this estimate in South Africa, we use the same value as Feldstein (1997). With marginal 
corporate income tax rate at 30 percent
9
, a 2 percent reduction in inflation raises the net of tax return and hence, 
decreases the effective tax rate by 0.30(0.57)(0.02) = 0.0034 or 0.34 percentage points. The interaction of the 
interest deduction and inflation moves the after-tax yield in the opposite direction. If each percentage point of 
inflation raises the nominal corporate borrowing rate by one percentage point
10
, the real pre-tax cost of borrowing is 
unchanged, but companies get an addition deduction in calculating their taxable income. With debt to capital ratio of 
59 percent
11
 and a corporate tax rate of 30 percent, a 2 percent decline in inflation raises the effective tax rate by 
                                                 
5 Even though the inflation over the period of 1990-2007 was 7.3 percent on average, we decided to use a figure of 2 percent to 
make our analysis comparable with the literature that uses Feldstein‟s (1997, 1999) approaches. Note also, we consider the period 
of 1990-2007 for our calculations, due to data availability on all the relevant variables over this time period.  
6 The return on equity is calculated using the percentage change in the All Share Index (ALSI). Source: International Financial 
Statistics. 
7 Source: McGregory BFA. 
8 The value corresponds to the average of marginal individual tax rate and capital gains tax for individuals (Source: Tax Pocket 
Guide 2006/7). 
9 Source: The value corresponds to the average marginal corporate tax rate (Source: World Bank, World development Indicators). 
10 See footnote 24 in Feldstein (1997) for further details.  
11 Source: McGregory BFA. The value of debt to capital ratio is obtained by dividing total liabilities with total assets using 
balance sheets of all companies    between 1990-2007. 
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0.30(0.59)(0.02)=0.0035 or 0.35 percentage points. The difference of the two effects at corporate level is almost 
insignificant. 
 
 Beside the impact of inflation at the corporate level, the lower inflation rate affects the taxes at the 
individual level as well. As individual income taxes are levied on nominal interest payments and nominal capital 
gains, a reduction in the rate of inflation further reduces the effective tax rate and raises the real after-tax of return. 
The part of this relation that is associated with the taxation of nominal interest at the level of the individual can be 
approximated in a way that mirrors the effect at the corporate level. If the nominal interest rate increases by one 
percentage point for every percentage point of inflation, the individual investors‟ real pretax return on debt is 
unchanged, but the after tax return falls and is given by the product of the statutory marginal tax rate and the change 
in inflation. Assuming the same 59 percent debt share at the individual level, as assumed for the corporate capital 
stock, and 25 percent average individual marginal tax rate, a 2 percent decline in inflation lowers the effective tax 
rate by 0.25(0.59)(0.02)=0.003 or 0.3 percentage points.  
 
 Next, we consider the effect of inflation on capital gains, excluding dividend, as the individual dividend 
return on capital ownership is unaffected by inflation except at the corporate level. A higher rate of inflation 
increases the taxation of capital gains. Even though the effective tax rate on capital gains is taxed at the same rate as 
other investment income, the effective tax rate is lower because the tax is only levied on realization of the gains.  
Given an effective tax rate of 10 percent
12
 on nominal capital gains in South Africa, in equilibrium, each percentage 
point increase in the price level raises the nominal value of the capital stock by one percentage point. Since the 
nominal value of the liabilities remains unchanged, the nominal value of the equity rises by 1/(1-b) percentage point, 
where b is the debt-to-capital ratio. With b=0.59 and an effective tax on nominal capital gain of 10 percent; 
i.e., 0.1g  , a 2 percent decline in the rate of inflation raises the real after-tax rate of return on equity by 
 1/ 1   g b d =0.0049 or 0.49 percentage points. However, since equity is assumed to represent 35 percent of the 
individual‟s portfolio‟13, the lower effective capital gains tax raises the overall rate of return by only 35 percent of 
this 0.49 percentage points or 0.17 percentage points. Combining the debt and capital effects implies that reducing 
the inflation rate by 2 percentage points reduces the effective tax rate at the individual investor level by the 
equivalent of 0.47 percentage points, with the real net return to the individual saver at 4.41 percent. This implies that 
price of retirement consumption is 1p =0.2740. Substituting these values for the price of retirement consumption into 
equation (4) yields:  
 
1G =0.066 2S  1 sp        (5) 
 
The Saving Rate and the Saving Behavior 
 
 The value of 2S in equation 5 represents the savings during pre-retirement years at the existing inflation. To 
evaluate (5), we need an estimate of the savings of the young at an inflation rate of 2 percent ( 2S ). Feldstein (1997) 
derives an estimate from the steady-state relationship between savers and dis-savers implied by the two–period 
model. He shows that the saving of the young is  1
T
g  times the savings of the older generation, where n is the 
rate of population growth and g is the growth in per capita wages. Thus net personal savings ( NS ) is related to 
2S according to: 
 
2
_
2 )1( SgnSS
T
N       (6) 
 
 Real average wage growth in South Africa over the period 1990-2007 was 3.73 percent, while population 
growth was 1.71 percent. On the other hand, the average private saving rate over the same period was 5.4 percent of 
                                                 
12 Source: Tax Pocket Guide 2006/7. 
13 Source: Financial Services Board. 
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GDP. Based on these numbers, we have: n+g=0.0218 and with T=30, it implies 2S =2.1 NS . Further, using private 
savings to be 5.4 percent of GDP results in 2S =0.11GDP. Further, the average share of wage in GDP between 1990 
and 2007 was equal to 48 percent. Then, the propensity to save out of exogenous income is: 
2( * )S GDP  where is the share of wage in GDP.  With  =0.48, 0.23  . 
 
 The final term to be evaluated in order to calculate the welfare gain described in equation 5 is the elasticity 
of savings with respect to real interest rate, since the uncompensated elasticity of savings, with respect to the price of 
retirement consumption, is related to elasticity with respect to the real rate of return as: 
 1 ) sr
sp
r
rT


 
 . Following 
Dolado et al. (1998) and Balshki et al. (1998), we assume that 0.2
rs
  .14 As in Feldstein (1997), we also assume a 
value of 0
rs
  to assess the sensitivity of this estimate to the value of 
rs
 .  
 
 Given this, the annual gain from reduced distortion of consumption is 1G =0.0069 GDP or 0.69 percent of 
GDP when 0.2
rs
  , and for 0
rs
  , we have 1G =0.0056GDP or 0.56 percent of GDP. These calculations suggest 
that the traditional welfare effect on the timing of consumption of a reduction in inflation rate by 2 percent is bound 
between 0.56 percentage points of GDP to 0.69 percentage point of GDP. 
 
Indirect Revenue Effects 
 
 Next we consider the effect on government revenue of the above experiment. The working assumption 
here, as in Feldstein (1997), is that any reduction of government revenue due to a move from two percent inflation to 
price stability cannot be made good by a rise in lump-sum taxes. Instead, distortionary taxes are required to fill in 
the financial gap, with obvious corresponding welfare implications. 
 
 Assume that we start in a situation where the price of retirement income is 2p and consumption level is 2c  
(see Figure 1) with inflation at two percent and the current tax system in place. Now consider lowering the inflation 
rate to zero. There are two offsetting effects on revenue. On one hand, lower inflation raises the real return to saving, 
thus lowers the price of retirement to 1p . This results in a loss of revenue equal to  2 1 2p p c . On the other hand, 
the lower price of retirement consumption stimulates higher consumption by  21 cc  , which in turn, generates 
revenue by the amount of    1 0 1 2p p c c   . 
 
 The change in revenue can thus be captured by:  
 
 2
1 0 2 1 2 1
1
2 2 2
sp
p p p p p p
dREV S
p p p
 
         
         
       
    (7) 
 
 This expression can, in principle, be either positive or negative, but in our case, it substitutes the earlier 
estimates for values 0p , 1p , 2p  . We get net revenue loss of dRE  -0.0079GDP or -0.79percent of GDP for 

rs
=0.2 and -0.009GDP or -0.9 percent of GDP for
rs
=0.  Assuming that   represents the dead weight loss when 
each rand of revenue that needs to be raised from other taxes due to loss in revenue, the net loss in revenue of 
shifting from two percent inflation to price stability is 0.36 percent and 0.32 percent of GDP under sr =0 and 0.2, 
respectively. Note, following Feldstein (1997), is set at 0.4. Overall, net welfare gain ( 1NG ) from reducing 
inflation by 2 percent is then given by: 1 1 ReNG G d v  . For  =0.4, the net welfare gains are, respectively, 
                                                 
14 The decision to use a value of 0.20 for 
rs
, which is, in general, the lower bond of this estimate available in the literature, is in 
line with the observation of low interest sensitivity of savings in South Africa.  
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equal to 0.37 withsr =0.2 and 0.20 with sr =0. For  =1.5, the welfare gains are forfeited for both sr =0 and 
sr =0.2.  
 
The Gain from Reducing Distortion in Housing Demand 
 
 In some countries, owner-occupied housing is generally given special treatment on individual income 
taxation in order to encourage investment in housing and therefore stimulate economic growth. The benefit of 
owner-occupied housing is that the mortgage interest payments and property tax rates are tax deductible. This is not 
the case for South Africa, since such deductions are not applicable. According to (Bonato, 1998), when mortgage 
interest payment is not tax deductible, inflation only indirectly affects demand for housing. This leads to reduction in 
the return on alternative assets. The state of price stability reduces this distortion as well as the loss of tax revenue, 
by moving capital from housing to the business sector. Given this, welfare effect of inflation on housing demand can 
be graphically represented in Figure 2:  
 
 
Figure 2. Distortion in Housing Demand 
 
 
 Figure 2 shows the compensated demand for housing services. The horizontal line at 0R  represents the 
undistorted cost of housing – the „true‟ supply curve. The dead weight loss due to taxation is represented by triangle 
A, while the dead weight loss due to inflation is represented by the area of the trapezoid C+D. The reduction in the 
dead weight loss, that results from reducing the distortion to housing demand when the inflation declines from two 
percent to zero, is: 
 
     2 0 1 1 2 2 10.5G R R R R H H        
 
where     2 1 2 1/H H dH dR R R    
 
     2 2 2 2 2 1/ / /dH dR R H H R R R  
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where HR    is the compensated elasticity of housing demand with respect to the rental rate. 
 
2H  is the demand for owner-occupied housing and R represents the rental cost of housing per rand of housing 
capital. In many countries, effective subsidies to housing demand, arising from the combination of inflation and tax 
system, reduces the implied rental cost of housing and leads to overconsumption of housing  2H , compared to 
situations of no taxes and no inflation  0H .  
 
 In the absence of tax and inflation, the implicit rental cost is equal to  
 
0 0R r m         (9) 
 
where 0r is the return on real rate of return on equity, m is the cost of maintenance per rand of housing capital, and 
 is the rate of depreciation. With 0r =0.0706, m =0.074
15
 and 0.05  16 implies 0R =0.1946. 
 
 With the current tax regime and inflation, the revised implicit rental cost is  
 
    2 1m n pR r r m                       (10) 
 
where  is the loan-to-value ratio, mr  is the real mortgage interest rate, nr is the rate of return on equity with taxes 
and two percent inflation rate, and p is the property tax rate. With   equal to 0.7
17
, mr   equal to 0.097
18
 and p  
equal to 0.002
19
, 2R =0.1913. The combination of tax and two percent inflation reduces the rental cost from 19.46 
cents per rand of housing capital to 19.13 cents per rand of housing capital. 
 
 Next we look at the effect of a decrease in the rate of inflation on this implicit rental cost of owner-
occupied housing: 
 
   2 * / 1 / 1m ndR dr d d r d         . 
 
With 1r =0.0441 at   0 and nr =0.0394 at  =0.02, /ndr d =-0.235 and   / nd r d =0.765. Therefore, 
 
 2 / 0.765 1 1dR d      .    (11) 
 
=-0.0705. 
                                                 
15 Source:  Statistics South Africa. 
16 Source:  National Department of Housing, South Africa. 
17 Source:  Standard Bank of South Africa Limited. 
18 Source:  SARB. 
19 Source:  SARB. 
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 Since 2R =0.1913 at two percent inflation, this implies 1R =0.1927 at zero inflation. 
 
 We now go on and calculate 
2G . Due to the lack of data on housing stock and rental rates in South Africa, 
we use an elasticity of 0.3 as in Bonato (1998).
20
 With 2H  equal to 2.08, which is gross fixed capital formation for 
residential building as a percentage of GDP
21
, the welfare gain is equal to 0.001 percent of GDP.  
 
Indirect Revenue Effects  
 
 In the case of owner-occupied housing, zero inflation would result in an increase in tax revenues. Shifting 
capital from owner-occupied housing to business capital will lead to additional revenue equal to 
 
 1 21 2 0 1
2
Re HR
R R
d v H r r
R


     (12) 
 
=0.012 percent of GDP  
 
 Secondly, this increase in tax revenue is partly offset by a loss in the revenue from property taxes due to 
reduction of the housing stock. This loss can be estimated as 
 
1 2
2 2
2
Re HR p
R R
d v H
R
 

    (13) 
 
=0.0009 
 
 Assuming a constant debt to GDP ratio, the increases in the real value of interest payments is equal to the 
product of the change in inflation times the marginal tax rate on interest payment, i (which we assume to be equal 
to average marginal individual tax rate) times the ratio of debt, B, to GDP, as shown in Feldstein (1997). 
 
Seigniorage and Distortion of Money Demand 
 
Money Demand 
 
 An increase in inflation raises the cost of holding non-interest bearing money balances and therefore 
reduces the demand for such balances below the optimal level. It is this resulting dead  weight loss of inflation that 
has been the primary focus of literature on the welfare effects of inflation since Bailey‟s (1956) pioneering paper. 
 
 Assuming that the initial situation is characterized with inflation 2 and a positive nominal interest rate 
2 2 2n ni r   , reducing inflation entails a welfare gain. Graphically, this can be depicted as shown in Figure 3: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Given the inelastic rental market in South Africa, we believe that the choice of this value is a reasonable one. 
21 Source: SARB. 
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Figure 3:  Money Market Distortion 
 
 
 As shown in the Figure 3 above, which plots the demand for money as a function of nominal interest rate, a 
reduction in inflation (from 2  to 1 ) leads to an increase in money demand (from 1M  to 2M ) and to a welfare 
gain presented by the area C plus the area D between the money demand curve and zero opportunity cost line. To 
compute the welfare gain, it is necessary to estimate the change in nominal interest rates caused by the reduction in 
inflation and induced increase in money demand  1 2M M . Recall that with a true initial inflation 2 of 2 percent, 
the real net of tax return in South Africa is 3.94 percent, which leads to a nominal interest rate 2ni  of 5.94 percent.    
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 Since the demand deposit component of M1 is now generally interest-bearing, non-interest-bearing money 
in South Africa is represented by M1A. Between 1990 and 2007, the ratio of currency in circulation to GDP was 
15.3 percent, thus M=0.153GDP. Using Meltzer‟s (1963) log-log money demand specification, which is also 
recommended by Gupta and Uwilingiye (2008) for South Africa, we obtain an elasticity of money demand equal to 
0.21 based on the Fischer and Seater (1993) long-horizon approach. Given this, 
 
3G =0.00079*0.21*0.153*(1/0.0594) GDP =0.00043GDP or 0.043 percent of GDP. 
 
The Revenue Effects of Reduced Money Demand 
 
 The reduction in inflation affects government revenue in three ways. First, the reduction in the inflation tax 
on money balances results in a loss of Seignorage and therefore, an associated welfare loss of raising revenue by 
other distortionary taxes (Phelps, 1973). In equilibrium, inflation at rate   implies revenue equal to M . Increases 
in inflation raise the seignorage revenue by:  
 
 / /dSeignorage d M dM d      (15) 
 
    / 1 / /M n nM GDP d r d r GDP                       
 
M=0.153 GDP, M =0.21,  /nd r d  =0.765,   0.02 and nr  =0.0594  
 
 A decrease of inflation from 0.02  to 0   leads to a loss of seignorage by 0.0029GDP. 
 
 The corresponding welfare loss is 0.29    percent of GDP. With  =0.4, the welfare cost of lost 
seignorage is 0.116 percent of GDP. Clearly, the benefit of reducing inflation via an increase in money demand is 
outweighed by the loss of revenue from seigniorage. Specifically, a reduction of inflation by two percent would 
imply a welfare loss of 0.116 percent of GDP, which is obviously much less than the 0.098 percent gain that could 
be obtained using the estimation and calculations of Gupta and Uwilingiye (2008a). 
 
 The second revenue effect is the revenue loss that results from shifting capital to money balances from 
other productive assets. The decrease in business capital is equal to the increase in the money stock,  
 
   1 2 / 0.0153 0.0153nM M dM d r        
1
M nM r 

  0.83     (16)  
 
percent of GDP. When these assets are invested in business capital, they earn a real pretax return of 7.06 percent, but 
a net of tax return of only 4.41. The difference is the corporate and personal tax payments of 2.65 percent.  Applying 
this to the increment in capital of 0.83 percent of GDP implies a revenue loss of 0.02650.83=0.022 percent of 
GDP. The welfare gain from this revenue loss is 0.022  percent of GDP. Again with  =0.4, the welfare loss from 
this source is 0.009 percent of GDP.  
 
 The third revenue effect of the change in the demand for money is the result of the government‟s ability to 
substitute the increases in money balance of 1 2M M  for interest bearing government debt. Although this is a one-
time substitution, it reduces government debt service permanently by: 
 
 1 2ngr M M        (17) 
 
where ngr  is the real interest rate paid by the government on its outstanding debt, net of the tax that it collects on 
those payments, given by ngr =0.75  0.153 0.075  0.04. 
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 The reduced debt service cost is  1 20.04 M M  =0.00033 or 0.033 percent of GDP. For  =0.4, the 
corresponding welfare gain is equal to 0.013 percent of GDP. 
 
 Combining all three effects, we have total revenue losses equal to 0.112 when 0.4  . The net welfare loss 
due to decreased revenue is equal to 0.07. Note Phelps‟ (1973) revenue effects are bigger than Bailey‟s (1956) 
money demand effect, which, in turn, means that the welfare loss from reduced seignorage revenue is bigger than 
the welfare gain from the reduced distortion of money demand following a move from two percent inflation to price 
stability.  
 
Debt Service and the Government Budget Constraint 
 
 Finally, we analyze the effect of the higher real cost of servicing the national debt following a reduction in 
the inflation rate. With inflation, the nominal interest payments are taxed; therefore, lower inflation reduces the 
nominal interest rate on government debt and reduces the real value of taxes on interest payment to individuals. A 
lower inflation hence leaves real pre-tax interest rate unchanged which leads to no change on pre-tax cost of debt 
service, but reduces the tax revenue on the government debt payments which, in turn, leads to a higher level of other 
distortionary taxes.  
 
 Assuming a constant debt to GDP ratio, the increases in the real value of interest payments is equal the 
product of the change in inflation times the marginal tax rate on interest payment, i (which we assume to equal to 
average marginal individual tax rate) times the ratio of debt, B, to GDP, as shown in Feldstein (1997) . Hence, the 
welfare effect of the change in taxes required to offset the change in real government revenue is
22
: 
 
4R /id EV d B GDP        (18) 
 
= 0.02 0.25 0.41    =0.00205 or 0.21 percent of GDP. 
 
 The reduction of inflation by two percentage point will reduce the welfare by 0.21  . 
 
With  0.4  ,   the net welfare revenue is -0.08 percent of GDP. 
 
The Net Effect of Lower Inflation on Economic Welfare 
 
 We can now bring together the several effects of reduced inflation that have been identified and evaluated 
in the previous sections and compare them with the one-time output losses required to achieve the inflation 
reduction. As can be seen from Table 1, adding up all four distortions, we obtain a welfare gain of 0.225 percent of 
GDP welfare by moving from an average inflation of two percent to price stability. But when compared to 
Feldstein‟s (1997) estimate, our welfare gain is four times less than what he obtained.23 This is mainly due to the 
fact that the gain due to a move from two percent inflation to price stability, resulting from the distortions on 
intertemporal allocation of consumption and the housing market demand, is much higher in the case of the USA 
when compared to South Africa. This, in turn, results from the facts that the tax structure has a smaller distortionary 
effect on the choice between current and future consumption in emerging economies, like South Africa than in the 
US, and also because with interest payment and property rates not being tax deductable, inflation affects demand for 
housing only indirectly.  However, at the same time, what is more important to us is that this measure of welfare loss 
is bigger than the value of 0.098 percent of GDP that could be obtained using the consumer surplus approach used 
by Gupta and Uwilingiye (2009b), which merely measures the distortion in the money demand due to positive 
nominal interest rates.  
                                                 
22 See Feldstein (1997) for details on derivations to obtain equation (18). 
23 In fact, in general, barring Poland, estimated at 0.125 percent of GDP, our estimate of welfare gain is less than all the other 
estimates, obtained using Feldstein‟s (1997, 1999) approaches, available in the literature. Specifically, the welfare gains 
following a permanent reduction of inflation by 2 percent was found to be 1.41 percent of GDP in Germany, 0.39 percent of GDP 
in New Zealand, 1.88 percent of GDP in Spain and  0.316 percent of GDP in Ukraine. The only estimate that comes close to that 
of ours is that of the United Kingdom, which is measured at 0.21 percent of GDP.    
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Table 1:  Overall Welfare Gain of Moving from Two Percent Inflation to Price Stability 
 
Welfare effect 
Welfare gain as percent of GDP 
South Africa Feldstein (USA) 
Inter-temporal 0.37 0.926 
Housing Demand 0.005 0.22 
Money Market -0.07 -0.034 
Debt servicing -0.08 -0.100 
Total 0.225 1.012 
 
 
 Moreover, once we take into account Feldstein‟s (1997, 1999) argument that benefits of inflation are 
permanent, and hence, one should obtain its present value from reducing inflation permanently by two percent, even 
the relatively small-sized welfare gain of 0.225 percent of GDP translates into 15 percent of GDP, realizing that the 
relevant discount rate is (ra-χ), since benefits grow at the same rate, χ, as GDP. Recall that ra is the after-tax real 
return on savings and equals 3.94 percent, while the average growth rate of GDP (χ) for 1990-2007 was 2.44 
percent, yielding a discount rate of 66.67. On the other hand, given that the sacrifice ratio for South Africa is 0.017
24
 
percent of GDP (Tunali, 2008), the one-time cumulative loss of output is 0.034 percent of GDP following a 
reduction in the inflation rate from two percent to zero. Clearly, the current benefits, not to say the present value of 
the same, overwhelmingly outweigh the output loss originating from such a disinflationary policy.        
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This study makes the first attempt to calculate the benefit of moving from low inflation to price stability in 
South Africa using a micro partial equilibrium framework developed by Feldstein (1997, 1999). Looking at 
interaction between inflation and a non-indexed tax system, our calculations show that the benefits for moving from 
an inflation of two percent to zero is equal to 0.225 percent of GDP, which is more than twice the size of the 
estimates that could be obtained following Bailey‟s (1956) consumer surplus approach, based on the interest 
elasticity of money demand calculated by Gupta and Uwilingiye (2009b).  
 
 The paper emphasizes the distortions caused by the interaction of inflation and capital income taxation in 
calculating the gain from moving to a zero rate of inflation. Though the annual dead weight loss of a two percent 
inflation rate is a relatively small number when compared to the literature, since the real gain from shifting to price 
stability is permanent, the present value is a substantial multiple of the annual welfare gain and is found to be 15 
percent of GDP. Since the corresponding one-off output cost of moving from two percent inflation to price stability 
is 0.034 percent of GDP, the gain outweighs the cost by an overwhelming margin. Further, when one realizes that 
the calculations are symmetric and, approximately, linear, our results make a strong case for rethinking the width 
and the upper and lower limits of the target band, at least from the point of view of welfare costs of inflation. 
Clearly, the discounted welfare gains will be quite substantial by moving to a narrower and lower target band and 
would also come at no cost to employment and output.     
 
 Dotsey and Ireland (1996) evaluated the welfare cost of inflation in dynamic general equilibrium 
endogenous and exogenous growth frameworks. By viewing inflation as a tax on micro-level decisions, the authors 
were able to identify explicitly, and quantify empirically, sizeable welfare costs of inflation at a macroeconomic 
level, indicating that a partial equilibrium approach, like the one used in this paper, can significantly underestimate 
the cost of inflation. Given this, there is no denying the fact that one can achieve possibly larger gains by reducing 
the inflation in a dynamic general equilibrium endogenous growth economic structure and that it is an important 
research question for the future to correctly evaluate the inflation targeting regime in South Africa based on welfare 
cost estimates. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 Gonçalves and Carvalho (2008) obtain negative numbers for the sacrifice ratio, implying that disinflation can be achieved 
without any output costs. 
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